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THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFr ON THE MIAMI LABOR MARKET
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the effect of the
Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market, focusing on the wages
and unemployment rates of less-skilled workers. The Mariel
immigrants increased the population and labor force of the Miami
metropolitan area by 7 percent. Most of the immigrants were
relatively unskilled: as a result, the proportional increase in
labor supply to less-skilled occupations and industries was much
greater. Nevertheless, an analysis of wages of non-Cuban workers
over the 1979-85 period reveals virtually no effect of the Mariel
influx. Likewise, there is no indication that the Boatlift lead to
an increase in the unemployment rates of less-skilled blacks or
other non-Cuban workers. Even among the Cuban population wages and
unemployment rates of earlier immigrants were not substantially




Princeton, NJ 08544One of the chief concerns of immigration policy makers is the extent
to which immigrants depress the labor market opportunities of less-skilled
natives. Despite the strong presumption that an influx of immigrants will
reduce native wages, existing empirical studies suggest that the effect is
small.1 There are two leading explanations for this finding. First,
immigrants have on average only slightly lower skill characteristics than
the native population.2Thus, econometric studies based on the
distribution of the existing stock of immigrants probably Understate the
effect of unskilled immigration on less-skilled natives. Second, the
locational choices of immigrants and natives presumably depend on expected
labor market opportunities. Immigrants tend to move to cities where the
growth in demand for labor can accommodate their supply. Even if new
immigrants cluster in only a few cities (as they do in the US), inter-city
migration of natives will tend to offset the adverse effects of
immigration.
These considerations illustrate the difficulty of using the correlation
across cities between wages and immigrant densities to measure the effect
of immigration on the labor market opportunities of natives. They also
1See thesurvey by Greenwood and McDowell (1986), and studies by
Grossman (1982), Borjas (1987), Lalonde and Topel (1988) and Altonji and
Card (1989).
2For example, tabulations from the 1980 Census indicate that in 1980
16.3 percent of natives over age 25 had 4 or more years of college and 67.7
percent were high-school graduates. By comparison, 15.8 percent of
immigrants had 4 or more years of college and 53 percent were high school
graduates. See U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census 1980
Census of Population Characteristics of the Population -Detailed
Population Characteristics (Volume 1, Chapter D, Part 1, United States
Summary: PC8O-l-Dl-A) Table 255.
3See Filer (1988) for a recent attempt to examine this phenomenon.2
underscore the value of a natural experiment that corresponds more closely
to an exogenous increase in the supply of immigrants to a particular labor
market.
The experiences of the Miami labor market in the aftermath of the
Mariel Boatlift form one such experiment. From May to September 1980, some
125,000 Cuban immigrants arrived in Miami on a flotilla of privately-
chartered boats. Their arrival was the consequence of an unlikely sequence
of events, culminating in Castro's declaration on April 20 1980 that Cubans
4
wishing to emigrate to the US were free to leave from the port of Mariel.
The available data suggest that 50 percent of the Mariel immigrants settled
permanently in Miami. The result of this influx was a 7 percent increase
in the overall population and labor force of Miami, and a 20 percent
increase in the Cuban population and labor force.
This paper summarizes the effects of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami
labor market, focusing on the effects on wages and unemployment rates of
less-skilled workers. The analysis is based on individual micro-data for
1979-85 from the merged outgoing rotation group samples of the Current
Population Survey (CPS). Three features of the Mariel incident and the
Census data greatly facilitate the analysis. First, the CPS sample of the
Miami metropolitan area is relatively large: roughly 1200 individuals per
month. Second, a comprehensive picture of the Miami labor market in the
months just before the Mariel Boatlift is available from the 1980 Census.
(The Census was conducted on April 1) Finally, unlike most other ethnic
groups, Cubans are separately identified in the CPS questionnaire. Thus it
4See Masud-Piloto (1988, chapters 6-7) for an overview of the
political developments that lead to the Mariel Boatlift.3
is possible to estimate wage rates, unemployment rates, and other economic
indicators for both Cubans and non-Cubans in the Miami labor market, and to
measure the effects of the Mariel immigration on the two groups separately.
Observers in Miami at the time of the Boatlift noted the strain caused
by the Mariel immigration. The homicide rate increased nearly 50 percent
between 1979 and l98O. On the weekend of May 17, 1980 a three day riot
occurred in several black neighborhoods, killing 13. A government-
sponsored committee of inquiry identified other longstanding grievances in
the black community as the cause of the riot, but cited the labor market
competition posed by the Cuban refugees as an important background factor
(Governor of Florida's Dade County Citizen's Committee, 1980, pp. 14-15).
A more quantitative assessment is provided by the data in Figure 1,
which presents monthly unemployment rates in Miami in the months before and
after the start of the Boatlift.6 The unemployment rate in Miami rose from
5.0 percent in April 1980 to 7.1 percent in July 1980. As the figure makes
clear, however, state and national unemployment rates followed a similar
pattern, suggesting that the changes in Miami were not solely a response to
the Mariel influx. Nevertheless, widespread joblessness of the refugees
throughout the sunmier of 1980 contributed to a perception that labor market
opportunities for less-skilled natives were threatened by the Mariel
• . 7
immigrants.
5See Wilbanks (1984) Table 2.1,page 142.
6These data are seasonally adjusted, and are taken from Bureau of
Labor Statistics Employment and Earnings Table El (Table Dl after December
1981) various issues.
7For example, an article in Business Week (August 25 1980, pp.86-87)
contains quotes from an Florida State Employment Service official and a
Department of Labor Wage and Hours Division official noting the downward4
Despite this perception, the analysis in this paper gives no indication
of any short- or longer-term effect of the Mariel immigration on the wages
or unemployment rates of non-Cubans in Miami. Rather, the analysis
confirms the conclusion of earlier studies that the effect of immigration
is largely confined to members of the immigrant group itself. In the case
of the Mariel incident, most of this effect can probably be explained by
the characteristics of the new immigrants, who substantially lowered the
average skill level of the Cuban labor force in Miami.
I. Overview of the Miami Labor Market Before the Boatlift
For at least a decade prior to the Mariel Boatlift Miami was the most
immigrant-intensive city in the US. Tabulations from the 1980 Census
indicate that 35.5 percent of residents in the Miami Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (SMSA) were foreign born.8 This compares with 22.3
percent in Los Angeles, the major city with the next highest immigrant
fraction, and 6.1 percent nationwide. At the time of the Census 56 percent
of immigrants in Miami were of Cuban origin. The remaining foreign-born
residents, who accounted for 16 percent of the Miami population, included
other hispanic groups and a broad selection of Caribbean and European
nationals.
Miami also has a significant black population. The fraction of black
residents was 15.0 percent in 1970 and had increased to 17.3 percent at the
pressure on wages and working conditions in the unskilled segment of the
Miami labor market.
8The Miami SMSA consists of Dade county, and includes Miami City as
well as a number of smaller towns and cities. Throughout this paper, I use
"Miami" to refer to this broader geographic region.5
time of the 1980 Census. This dual concentration of immigrants and blacks
makes Miami somewhat unusual among larger US cities, but ideal for studying
the effect of increased immigration on the labor market opportunities of
black natives.9
Table 1 presents a comparative description of the four major groups in
the Miami labor force in 1979: white non-hispanics; black non-hispanics;
Cubans (foreign-born and native born); and other hispanics. For simplicity
I have restricted attention to individuals age 16-61. This group
represents roughly 60 percent of the Miami population. A total of 1564
observations are available for 16-61 year olds in the 1979 outgoing
rotation group file of the CPS: similar samples are available in subsequent
years.
The fractions of Cubans and blacks in the 16-61 age group are 27.2 and
26.3 percent, respectively, while white non-hispanics compose 34.4 percent
and non-Cuban hispanics 11.1 percent. Overall, 73 percent of this age
group participated in the labor force, with somewhat higher participation
rates among whites and Cubans, and lower rates among blacks and other
hispanics. Education levels in Miami are somewhat below the national
average: the mean of completed education for 16-61 year olds in 1979 was
11.8 years in Miami, compared with 12.2 years nationwide.
The occupation distributions in rows 7-17 of Table 1 give some
indication of the degree of labor market competition between the four
groups. Cubans and other hispanics have very similar occupation
distributions, with both groups having a higher representation in craft and
9Across 121 of the largest cities in the US in 1980 the correlation
between the fraction of immigrants and the fraction of native blacks is
-.16.6
operative occupations than either whites or blacks. Blacks are more highly
concentrated in laborer and service-related occupations, and are
significantly under-represented in managerial occupations.
One useful suxnmary measure of the overlap in the occupational
distributions of the different groups is the average percent increase in
labor supply in occupations held by one group that would result front a one
percentage point increase in the overall fraction of workers in a second
group.10 This index has the simple form E. i•S21 / S.,,where s1. is the
fraction of workers of group 1 in occupation j ,s2.is the fraction of
workers of group 2 in occupation j ,ands. is the fraction of all workers
in occupation j. Based on the distributions in Table 1, an inflow of
immigrants resulting in a one-point increase in the fraction of Cubans in
Miami would lead to a weighted average increase of .95 percent in the
supply of labor to occupations held by whites. Under the same conditions
the increase would be .99 percent for occupations held by blacks, 1.02
percent for non-Cuban hispanics, and 1.06 percent for Cubans themselves.
These calculations suggest that the overlap between the occupational
distributions of the four groups is relatively high.
II, The Mariel Immigration
Due to the unauthorized nature of the Boatlift no exact count of the
number of Mariel immigrants is available, and there is little precise
information on the characteristics and/or final destinations of the
immigrants. This section summarizes some of the available information,
including data from the March 1985 Mobility Supplement to the Current
10This index is derived in Altonji and Card (1989), pp. 15-16.7
Population Survey, which allows Mariel immigrants to be distinguished from
other Cubans.
Most sources estimate the number of Mariel immigrants who arrived in
1980 at between 120,000 and 125,000. A recent Census Bureau Current
Population Report states that 126,000 refugees entered the US as "Cuban
Entrants" (the special immigration status awarded to the Mariel refugees)
between April 1980 and June 1981.11 104,000 of these arrived between April
and June 1980. It is widely assumed that about one-half of these settled
permanently in Miami: for example, this assumption is used by the Census
Bureau in their "Experimental County Population Estimates" file.
Tabulations reported below from the March 1985 CPS confirm this belief.'2
Table 2 contains estimates of the Miami population for the years 1939
to 1985 from published Census sources and from my own tabulations of the
CPS. Census Bureau estimates of the Dade County population show an
increase of 80,500 from April 1 to July 1 of 1980, and a relatively slow
rate of increase thereafter. Annual counts from the CPS show an increase
of some 200,000 in the population of 16-61 year olds between 1979 and 1981,
and then a slowly decreasing count from 1981 to 1985. About one-half of
this increase was due to an increase in the number of Cubans: their share
of the 16-61 age group increased from 27 percent in 1979 to 33 percent in
1981. A similar increase is registered in CPS-based estimates of the Cuban
share of the 16-61 year old labor force, which moved from 37.2 percent in
ll Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census Current Population
Reports Series P-25, Number 1022, page 9.
should be noted that population estimates from the CPS rely on
the accuracy of Census Bureau weighting procedures, which are themselves
based on estimates of local populations.8
1979 to 44.8 percent in 1981. Assuming that the Cuban shares of the
population and labor force would have remained constant between 1979 and
1981 in the absence of the Boatlift, these figures suggest that the Mariel
immigration added 56,000 individuals to the Miami working age population
and approximately 45,000 to the Miami labor force: increases of 7 percent.
From the first days of the Boatlift the characteristics of the Mariel
immigrants have been a subject of controversy. Among those who were
permitted to leave Cuba were several hundred inmates of mental hospitals
and jails. Many of these individuals were arrested by immigration
officials upon their arrival into the US, and over 1000 were sent to a
special prison facility in Atlanta to await deportation back toCuba)3 A
similar number were arrested for crimes committed in the US and still await
a determination of their ultimate immigrationstatus.14 Contemporary
reports indicate that the Mariel immigrants included a relatively high
fraction of less-skilled workers, and a high fraction of individuals with
low English ability (see the article in Business Week)
Although the questions in the regular Current Population Survey
provide insufficient information to identify Mariel immigrants from other
foreign and native-born Cubans, the March 1985 Mobility Supplement asks
each respondent where he/she lived in March 1980 (one month before the
start of the Boatlift). Table 3 presents a descriptive summary of the
L3See Masud-Piloto (1988, pp. 100-103). Under a 1984 agreement a
total of 2700 Mariel immigrants were to be returned to Cuba.
14Mariel immigrants were blamed for and indeed seem to have committed
a relatively high number of crimes in the first few months after the
boatlift. Wilbanks (1984) reports that 38 of the 574 homicides in Miami in
1980 were committed by Mariel immigrants. Disaffected Mariels were
involved in 6 airline highjacking attempts in August 1980. See Masud-
Piloto (1988, pp. 95-96).9
Cuban population interviewed in the March 1985 CPS, classified by whether
the respondent claimed to be living abroad or in the US five years earlier.
The sample sizes, particularly of post-1980 entrants, are small)5
Nevertheless, these data confirm the general impression that on average
Mariel immigrants have less education, are somewhat younger, and are more
likely to be male than other Cuban immigrants.
The figures in Table 3 also suggest that the Mariel immigrants have
lower labor force attachment and lower wage rates than other Cubans. The
occupation distributions in rows 8a-8k suggest that the Mariels are more
heavily concentrated in laborer and service occupations that other Cubans,
and are less likely to hold sales, clerical, and craft jobs. Relative to
other Cubans, the occupations of the Mariel immigrants are therefore more
similar to those of black workers.
The unadjusted wage gap between Mariels and other Cubans is 34 percent.
Part of this differential is attributable to the lower education levels and
younger ages of the Mariels. A simple linear regression for the logarithm
of average hourly earnings fitted to the sample of Cubans with earnings in
1984 suggests that the Mariels earned 18 percent lower wages than other
Cubans, controlling for education, potential experience, and sex (the
standard error of this estimate is .08). This gap probably reflects the
combination of lower language ability and a shorter assimilation time in
the US among the Mariel immigrants, as well as any permanent differences in
ability and/or motivation between the earlier and later Cuban immigrants.
15The weighted count of all Cubans in the March 1985 CPS who entered
the US after 1980 is 85,800, which is only 69 percent of the estimated
125,000 Mariel refugees.10
III. The Effect of the Mariel Immigration of the Miami Labor Market
Tables 4 and 5 present simple averages of wage rates and unemployment
rates for whites, blacks, Cubans, and other hispanics in the Miami labor
market between 1979 and 1985. In order to provide a comparative
perspective for evaluating the changes that took place over this period, I
have also assembled similar data for whites, blacks, and hispanics in four
"comparison" cities: Atlanta, Los Angeles, Houston, and Tampa-St.
Petersburg. These four cities were selected to generate relatively large
samples of blacks and hispanics, while at the same time exhibiting a
pattern of economic growth similar to that in Miami over the late 1970's
and early 1980's. A comparison of employment growth rates (based on
establishment-level data) suggests that economic conditions were very
similar in Miami and the average of the four comparison cities between 1976
and 1984.
The wage data in Table 4 reveal a number of facts. Perhaps most
obvious is that earnings are lower in Miami than in the comparison cities.
The differentials in 1979 ranged from 8 percent for whites to 15 percent
for blacks. A more surprising result is that real earnings levels of
whites in both Miami and the comparison cities were more-or-less constant
between 1979 and 1985. This is in contrast to the slight decline in real
wages in the overall US economy over this period (see Round and Johnson
(1989), pp. 5-6) and underscores the relatively close correspondence
between economic conditions in Miami and the comparison cities.
In contrast to the situation for whites, the trends in earnings for
nonwhites and hispanics differ somewhat between Miami and the comparison
cities. Riack wages in Miami were roughly constant from 1979 to 1981, then11
fell in 1982 and 1983 before recovering to their previous level in 1984.
Black earnings in the comparison cities, on the other hand, show a steady
downward trend between 1979 and 1985. Based on these data there is no
evidence of a negative impact of the Mariel immigration on black wages in
Miami. The data do suggest a relative downturn in black wages in Miami
during 1982-83. It seems likely, however, that this reflects an unusually
severe cyclical effect associated with the 1982-83 recession.I return to
this issue in Table 7, below.
Wage rates for non-Cuban hispanics in Miami were relatively stable
between 1979 and 1985, with only a slight dip in 1983. In contrast,
hispanic wage rates in the comparison cities fell about 6 percentage points
over this period. Again, there is no evidence of a negative effect in
Miami, either in the immediate post-Mariel period or over the longer run.
Table 4 does provide some indication of a decline in Cuban wage rates
relative to other groups in Miami. Relative to whites, for example, Cuban
wages fell by 6-7 percentage points between 1979 and 1981. Assuming that
the wages of earlier Cuban immigrants were constant, this decline is
consistent with the addition of 40,000 Mariel workers to the poo1 of Cubans
in the Miami labor force, and with the 34 percent wage differential between
Mariels and other Cubans noted in Table 3. A more thorough analysis of
Cuban wages is presented in Table 8, below.
The unemployment rates in Table 5 lead to the same general conclusions
as the wage data in Table 4. There is no strong evidence of an adverse
effect of the Mariel influx on the unemployment rates of either whites or
blacks. The unemployment rates suggest a severe cyclical downturn in the
black labor market in Miami in 1982-83. Black unemployment rates in Miami,12
which had been 2-4 points lower than those in the comparison cities from
1979 to 1981, equalled or exceeded those in the comparison cities from 1982
to 1984. The 1985 data indicate a return to the pre-1982 pattern, although
the sampling errors are large enough to prevent precise inferences.
In contrast to the pattern for whites and blacks, there was a sizeable
increase in Cuban unemployment rates in Miami following the Mariel
immigration. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots unemployment
rates of Cubans in Miami against those of non-hispanics (white and black)
over the 1979-85 period. The graph indicates that Cuban unemployment
rates were perhaps 3 percentage points higher during 1980-1981 than would
have been expected on the basis of earlier (and later) patterns. Assuming
that the unemployment rates of other Cubans were not affected by the Mariel
influx, this effect is consistent with unemployment rates of around 20
percent among the Mariels themselves. While far from conclusive, this
simple calculation suggests that the increase in Cuban unemployment rates
could easily be explained as a result of the addition of the Mariel
refugees to the Cuban population, with little or no effect on earlier
immigrants.
The simple averages of wages and unemployment rates in Tables 4 and 5,
which combine workers of all ages and education levels, do not directly
address the question of whether the Mariel immigration reduced the earnings
of less-skilled natives in Miami. A more direct answer is provided by the
data in Table 6. In order to identify "less-skilled" workers, I fit a
linear regression equation for the logarithm of hourly earnings to workers
in the comparison cities. The explanatory variables in this regression
included education, potential experience, squared potential experience,13
indicator variables for each sex and race group, and interactions of the
sex-race indicators with potential experience and squared potential
experience. I then used the estimated coefficients from this equation to
form a predicted wage for each non-Cuban worker in Miami, and sorted the
sample from each year into quartiles on the basis of predicted wage rates.
This procedure gives a simple way to identify more- and less-skilled
workers in the Miami labor market. Means of actual log wages for each
quartile and year are presented in the first four columns of Table 6. The
difference in mean wages between the first and fourth quartiles, which
provides an index of the spread in the wage distribution, is presented in
the fifth column of thetable.
If the Mariel inunigration reduced the wages of less-skilled natives,
one would expect to observe a decline in the wage of workers in the lowest
skill quartile, at least relative to workers in the upper quartile. The
actual averages show no evidence of this effect. Apart from a temporary
increase in relative wages of workers in the lowest quartile between 1979
and 1981, the distribution of non-Cubans wages in the Miami labor market
was remarkably stable between 1979 and 1985. Taken together with the data
in Table 4, there is little evidence of a negative effect of the Mariel
influx on the earnings of natives.
A final check is provided by Table 7, which contains more detailed
information on wages, employment rates, and unemployment rates for blacks
in Miami between 1979 and 1985. I have separately analyzed the set of all
blacks and the set of blacks with less than 12 years of education, to
isolate any differential effect on the less-skilled segment of the black
population. For both groups I have calculated the differential in wages14
between Miamiandthe comparison cities (both the unadjusted difference in
mean log wages, and a regression-adjusted differentialthat controls for
education, sex, marital status, part-time status, private/public
employment, and potential experience), and thedifferentials in the
employment-population rate and the unemployment rate between Miamiand the
comparison cities.
As indicated in Table 4, the wage differential for blacksin Miami
relative to those in the four comparison cities decreased slightlybetween
1979 and 1981. The differential increased substantially in 1982, butthen
began a steady downward trend after 1983. By 1985,the wage gap was less
than 5 percent for all black workers, and was actually positive for less-
educated blacks. The magnitudes of the regression-adjusted wage
differentials are not significantly different from the unadjusted
differentials, reflecting the similarity of the black populations in Miami
and the comparison cities. Like the unadjusted differentials, the adjusted
wage gaps show no evidence of any effect ofthe Mariel immigration on black
wages.
A similar conclusion emerges from the pattern of differentials in
employment-population rates and unemploymentrates.16 Among all blacks,
there is some evidence of a relative decline in the employment-to-
population ratio in Miami between 1979 and 1885. This effect seems tohave
started in 1982, but is less pronounced among low-education blacks. The
series of unemployment rate differentials indicate a worsening of relative
16i have also computed regression-adjusted employment-population and
unemployment gaps, using linear probability models. The explanatory power
of the statistical models is so low, however, that the adjusted
differentials are almost identical to the unadjusted differentials.15
unemployment for blacks in Miami, also starting in 1982, although the
unemployment gap closed in 1985. Given the two year lag between the
arrival of the Mariels and the emergence of this unemployment gap, it seems
more likely a result of the 1982 recession than a reaction to the influx of
less-skilled immigrants.
The effects of the Mariel immigration on Cuban labor market outcomes
are examined in detail in Table 8. The first column of the table
reproduces the means of log wages in each year from row 3 of Table 4. The
second column gives predicted log wages of Cubans in Miami, using estimated
coefficients from a regression equation fit to hispanics in the four
comparison cities. The gap between actual and predicted wages is presented
in the third column of the table. These series show that the 9 percentage
point decline in Cuban real wage rates in Miami between 1979 and 1985 was a
result of two complementary factors: a 6 percent relative decline in the
"quality" of the Cuban labor force in Miami, as measured by the decline in
their predicted wages; and a 3 percentage point increase in the quality-
adjusted wage gap between Cuban workers in Miami and hispanic workers in
the comparison cities. Two-thirds of the wage decline is therefore
attributed to the changing productivity characteristics of the Cuban labor
force, and only one-third to a decrease in the return to skills for Cubans
in the Miami labor market.
The next four columns of Table 8 give the means of log wages for Cuban
workers in each quartile of the distribution of predicted wages (using the
same prediction equation as was used to form the means in column 2). These
means suggest that real wage rates of Cubans in the lowest quartile of the
wage distribution declined by 11-12 percentage points between 1979 and16
1985. The decline is smaller for workers in the higher quartiles, but
there is some variation between 1984 and 1985, and in light of the sampling
errors it is difficult to draw precise inferences. The difference between
the means of the first and fourth quartiles is 9 percentage points higher
in 1984 than 1979, but the relative difference narrows to only 2 points in
1985. These figures are consistent with a larger decline in earnings at
the low end of the Cuban wage distribution after the Mariel immigration, as
might be expected from the addition of a large group of relatively
unskilled workers to the pool of Cubans. The extent of the decline,
however, is not precisely measured.
An alternative method of assessing the effect of the Mariel immigration
on the earnings of Cubans in the Miami labor market is to compare Cuban
wages in Miami to the wages of Cubans elsewhere in the US. Since the
fractions of Mariels in the Cuban labor force is roughly the same inside
and outside Miami, this comparison controls for any unobservable
differences in skill between the Mariels and other Cubans (due to language
ability, for example).'7 The ninth and tenth columns of Table 8 contain
estimates of the wage differential for Cubans in Miami relative to those
elsewhere in the US, both unadjusted and adjusted for education, sex, part-
time status, private sector/public sector employment, marital status
(interacted with sex) and potential experience.
The earnings differentials computed in this way are roughly constant
between 1979 and 1984. The 1982 unadjusted wage differential is 10
percentage points larger than earlier or later ones, but the regression-
17This is strictly true only if the unobservable differences have a
constant proportional effect on all Mariels, independent of the level of
observed skills or location choice.17
adjusted differential is not significantly different from any of the other
differentials. The 1985 data also indicate a slightly higher Cuban wage
rate outside Miami. In any case, a comparison of Cuban wages inside and
outside the Miami labor market shows no evidence of a widening gap in the
years immediately following the Mariel immigration. On the assumption that
the Mariel influx had no effect on the wage rates of other Cuban outside
Miami, this suggests that the observed downturn in Cuban wages in Miami can
be attributed solely to the "dilution" of the Cuban labor force with less-
skilled Mariel workers.
IV. Interpretation of the Findings
The data in tables 4-8 point to two conclusions. First, there was
essentially no effect of the Mariel immigration on the wages or employment
outcomes of non-Cuban workers in the Miami labor market. Second, and
perhaps even more surprising, there was no strong effect of the Mariel
immigration on the wages of other Cubans. The observed decline in average
Cuban wage rates in Miami after 1980 is no larger than would be expected by
simply adding the Mariel immigrants to the pooi of Cuban workers, assuming
that the Mariels earned about one-third less than other comparable Cubans
(as the March 1985 data suggest). This conclusion is confirmed by a
comparison of Cuban wage rates inside and outside Miami, which shows no
relative change over the period.
These conclusions lead naturally to the question of how the Miami labor
market was able to absorb a 7 percent increase in population and labor
force with no adverse effects. One possible answer is that the Mariels
displaced other immigrants and natives who would have moved to Miami in the18
early 1980's had the Boatlift not occurred. The population data in Table2
lend some credence to this explanation: 80 percent of the population
growth that occurred between 1979 and 1984 in Miami took place between
April and July 1980.
A broader perspective on this potential explanation is provided by
comparing population growth rates in Miami and other Florida cities between
1970 and 1986. From 1970 to 1980, Miami population grew at an annual rate
of 2.5 percent per year while the rest of Florida grew at a rate of 3.9
percent. After April 1, 1980 the growth rate in Miami slowed to 1.4
percent per year while that in the rest of the state decreased to 3.4
percent.18 The larger relative slowdown in Miami suggests that the
Boatlift may have actually deterred long-run population growth in Miami.
The population of Dade county in 1986 was about equal to the pre-Boatlift
projection of the University of Florida Bureau of Economic and Business
Research under their "low population growth" scenario.19
Nevertheless, data from the March 1985 Current Population Survey
suggest that Miami continued to attract new foreign-born immigrants after
1980. A total of 2.7 percent of all non-Cuban immigrants who arrived in
the US after March 1980 were living in Miami in March 1985. By comparison,
only 1.8 percent of all non-Cuban immigrants in the US at the time of the
1980 Census lived in Miami. Therefore, Miami attracted "more than its
18These figures are obtained from 1970 population counts in US Bureau
of the Census 1970 Census of Population -Numberof Inhabitants (PC(l)-Al),
Table 32, and 1980 and 1986 counts in US Bureau of the Census Current
Population Reports -LocalPopulation Estimates (P-26, No. 86-2-SC),
Table 1.
19See Florida Statistical Abstract 1981 (Table 1.24). The population
growth projections were formed using population growth data for the 1970's.19
share" of new non-Cuban immigrants to the US in the five-year period after
the Mariel immigration. The implication is that the slow-down in the rate
of growth of the Miami SMSA after June 1980 occurred because of a change in
the net migration rate of natives and older cohorts of immigrants, rather
than because of a change in the inflow rate of new immigrants. This
finding is consistent with the pattern of domestic migration between 1970
and 1980 identified by Filer (1988), who finds a strong negative
correlation across SMSA's between the net in-migration rate of natives and
the in-migration rate of immigrants.
A second potential explanation for the rapid absorption of the Mariel
immigrants is the expansion of industries that utilize relatively unskilled
labor. Altonji and Card's (1989) tabulations from the 1970 and 1980
Censuses indicate that a small number of industries employ a large fraction
of immigrants, and that these industries expanded more rapidly between 1970
and 1980 in cities with large immigrant populations. The immigrant-
intensive industries identified in their analysis include apparel and
textiles, agriculture, furniture, private household services, hotels and
motels, eating and drinking establishments, and business services. These
are all relatively low-wage industries that employ large numbers of semi-
skilled operatives and laborers.
Tabulations of the industry distributions of employment in Miami and
the entire US before and after the Mariel Boatlift are presented in Table
9. The "before" tabulations are based on reported industry of the main job
last year for respondents in the March 1979 and March 1980 Current
Population Surveys, while the "after" tabulations are based on similar data20
from the March 1984 and March 1985CPS.2° The relative importance of each
industry in the Miami labor market is indicated by the ratioof employment
shares in the third and seventh columns of the table. Finally, the
fractions of Cuban workers in each industry in the Miami labor market are
presented in the fourth and eighth columns of the table. In lightof the
relatively small sample of Miami workers I have grouped the low-wage
service industries identified by Altonji and Card (1989) (building
services, private household services, hotels and motels, and laundries and
cleaning services) into a single industry category. Nevertheless, the
numbers of workers in individual industries in the Miami labor market are
small, and the sampling errors associated with the Cuban percentages are
relatively large.
The tabulations for 1978-79 indicate that Miami had relatively high
employment shares in textile and apparel industries, transportation
(notably air transport), wholesale trade, less-skilled service industries,
and other personal service industries. The high employment share of
textiles and apparel is especially remarkable in light of the relatively
low concentration of other manufacturing industries in Miami. The data in
the fourth column of the table show that most of the textile and apparel
workers in Miami, and almost one-half of all other manufacturing workers,
were Cubans. Cubans were also over-represented in wholesale trade and
other personal service industries, but under-represented in transportation,
communication, and utility industries.
20The Census industry coding scheme used in the CPS was changed in
1983. For most of the industry groups identified in Table 10 there was
little change in the coding scheme.21
The employment tabulations from 1983-84 show a similar pattern to the
earlier data, with little evidence of a relative expansion of employment in
textiles, eating and drinking establishments, or less-skilled service
industries. The largest relative change occurred in the employment share
of agriculture, which increased from .83 percent to 2.33 percent in Miami,
while remaining relatively constant in the US as a whole. In view of the
relative stability in the fraction of Cubans in this industry, however, it
seems unlikely that this expansion was driven by the Mariel immigration.
The largest increase in the fraction of Cubans occurred in less-skilled
services, which moved from 14 percent Cuban before the Boatlift to about
one-third after. There is no evidence of a similar expansion in the
fraction of Cubans in textiles and apparel or other manufacturing.
On balance the data in Table 9 give little indication of a shift in the
industry distribution of employment in Miami between 1978 and 1984. On the
other hand the data suggest that the industry distribution in Miami in the
late 1970's was well-suited to handle an influx of unskilled immigrants.
In 1979 over one-third of the Miami labor force was made up of immigrants:
approximately one-third of these had arrived in the previous decade.21As
a result, immigrant-intensive industries such as textiles and apparel and
less-skilled service industries were well-established. Many of the Mariel
immigrants may have simply displaced earlier immigrants in these
industries, as older cohorts of immigrants moved to more attractive jobs.
21Tabulations from the 1980 Census show that of the 578,055 foreign-
born residents of Miami on April 1 1980, 205,887 (35.6 percent) arrived
after 1970. Of 324,976 foreign-born Cubans, 91,514 (28.2 percent) arrived
after 1970.22
V. Conclusions
The experiences of the Miami labor market in the aftermath of the
Mariel Boatlift provide a natural experiment with which to evaluate the
effect of unskilled immigration on the labor market opportunities of native
workers. The Mariel immigrants increased the population and labor force of
the Miami metropolitan area by 7 percent. Most of these immigrants were
relatively unskilled: as a result, the proportional increase inlabor
supply to less-skilled occupations and industries was much greater. An
analysis of wage rates for less-skilled non-Cuban workers, however,
suggests that the influx of Mariel immigrants had virtually noeffect.
Likewise, there is no evidence of an increase in unemployment among less-
skilled blacks or other non-Cuban workers. Rather, the data analysis
suggests a remarkably rapid transition of the Mariel immigrants intothe
Miami labor force, with negligible effects on other groups. Even among the
Cuban population there is no indication that wages or unemployment rates of
earlier immigrants were substantially effected by the arrival of the
Mariels.
Despite the clear-cut nature of these findings some caution is required
in their interpretation. The Miami labor market is atypical of other local
labor markets in the US. In the two decades before the Mariel Boatlift
Miami had absorbed a continuing flow of Cubans and other immigrants. The
Mariel immigration can be seen as part of a long-run pattern: one that may
have recently re-emerged with the arrival of Nicaraguans and other Central
Americans.
Three factors may have been especially important in facilitating the
absorption of the Mariel immigrants. First, a comparison of population23
growth rates in Miami and the rest of Florida suggests that the net
migration of natives and earlier cohorts of immigrants into the Miami area
slowed considerably after the Boatlift. To some extent the Mariels
displaced other migrants from within the US who would have moved to Miami
in the early 1980's. Second, the industry structure of the Miami labor
market was well-suited to make use of an influx of relatively unskilled
workers. This structure, and in particular the high concentration of
textile and apparel industries, evolved over the previous two decades in
response to earlier waves of immigration, and may have allowed the Mariel
immigrants to move into unskilled jobs as earlier cohorts of immigrants
moved into better jobs. Finally, because of the high concentration of
Spanish-speakers in Miami, the lack of English-speaking ability among the
Mariels may have had relatively smaller effects than could be expected for
other immigrant groups in other cities.24
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Characteristics of 16-61 Year-Olds in Miami, 1979
Whites Blacks CubansHispanics All
Characteristics of Population Age 16-61
1. Estimated 319.3 244.1 252.4 102.9 928.4
Number (1000's)
2. Mean Education 12.8 11.4 11.0 11.6 11.8
3. Percent in 75.6 68.3 77.2 68.8 73.1
LaborForce
Characteristics of Those in Labor Force
4. Estimated 241.3 166.6 194.7 70.8 678.2
Number (1000's)
5. Mean Education 13.1 11.8 11.3 11.9 12.1
6. Percent Age 16-24 21.1 24.1 22.0 26.0 22.8
Occupation Distribution
(Percent of Employed)
7. Professional 19.1 10.9 9.5 10.1 13.2
and Technical
8. Managers 15.7 2.8 8.6 8.1 9.4
9. Sales 6.2 4.4 7.8 7.6 6.5
10. Clerical 21.9 21.0 19.1 20.9 20.9
11. Craftsmen 13.3 9.4 15.1 12.7 12.8
12. Operatives 4.4 8.4 19.4 16.7 11.1
13. Transportation 2.6 8.1 5.4 5.9 5.2
Operatives
14. Laborers 5.1 10.5 4.7 4.0 6.3
15. Farm Workers 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.6
16. Less-Skilled 5.0 13.3 6.1 10.2 8.0
Service Workers
17. More-Skilled 5.7 10.9 4.0 3.0 6.2
Service WorkersNotes: White and black groups exclude hispanics. Hispanic group
includes all hispanics other than Cubans. Less-skilledservice
workers include cleaning and food service workers.More-skilled
service workers include health service, personal service,and
protective service workers. Data are based on samplesof
employed workers in the outgoing rotation groupsof the Current
Population Survey in 1979.Table 2













1979 928,400 252,400 678,200
1980 1,706,269 1,049,738 998,700 278,200 734,000
1981 1,135,600 372,000 830,400
1982 1,715,306 1,053,556 1,104,200 345,300 803,300
1983 1,128,000 343,500 853,300
1984 1,727,155 1,052,167 1,124,200 327,300 839,400
1985 1,192,200 321,900 867,000
Notes: aIDra from U.S. Bureau of the Census Experimental County
Population Estimates data file. Population age 16-61 is estimated
from 5-year interval population counts assuming a uniform age
distribution within intervals. 1980 estimates include estimated
Mariel immigrants as of that date. Miami population on Census Day
1 1980) was 1,625,781, of which 989,975 were age 16-61.
'Weighted counts from 12 monthly samples of outgoing rotation
groups in Current Population Survey.Table 3
Characteristics of Mariel Immigrants and Other Cubans:
Tabulations from March 1985 CPS
Mariel Immigrants All Other Cubans
1. Educational Attainment
Percent of Population
(a) No High School 56.5 25.4
(b) Some High School 9.1 13.3
(c) Completed High School 9.5 33.4
(d) Some College 6.8 12.0
(e) Completed College 18.1 15.8
2. Percent Male 55.6 50.7
3. Percent Under 30 in 1980 38.7 29.6
4. Mean Age in 1980 (Years) 34.9 38.0
5. Percent In Miami in 1985 53.9 52.4
6. Percent Worked in 1984 60.6 73.4
7. Mean LogHourlyEarnings 1.37 1.71
8. Occupation Distribution
(Percent of Employed)
(a) Professional/Managers 19.3 21.0
(b) Technical 0.0 1.5
(c) Sales 4.5 11.2
(d) Clerical 2.5 13.5
(e) Craftsmen 9.5 19.9
(f) Operatives 19.1 13.8
(g) Transportation Ops. 3.8 4.3
(h) Laborers 10.8 3.3
(i) Farm Workers 0.0 1.8
(J)Less-SkilledService 26.0 7.4
(k) More-Skilled Service 4.6 2.3
9.Sample Size 50 528
Weighted Count 42,300 476,900
Note: Sample consists of all Cubans in March 1985 Current Population Survey
age 21-66 (i.e., age 16-61 in 1980). Mariel immigrants are
identified as those Cubans who stated that they lived outside
the U.S. 5 years previously.Table 4
Logarithms of seal Hourly Earnings of Workers Age 16-61
In Miami and Four Comparison Cities: 1979-85
(standard errors in parentheses)





































































































Note: Entries represent means of log hourly earnings (deflated by the
Consumer Price Index 1980—100) for workers age 16-61 in Miami and foui
comparison cities: Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tampa-St.
Petersburg. See note to table 1 for definitions of groups. Data
are based on samples of employed workers in the outgoing rotation
groups of the Current Population Survey in 1979-1985. Due to a
change in SMSA coding procedures in 1985, the 1985 sample is based
on individuals in outgoing rotation groups for January-June of1985
only.Table 5
Unemployment Rates of Individuals Age 16-61
In Miami and Four Comparison Cities, 1979-85
(standard errors in parentheses)





































































































Note: Entries represent means of unemployment indicator variable for
individuals age 16-61 in Miami and four comparison cities: Atlanta,
Houston, LosAngeles,and Tampa-St. Petersburg. Samples are based
on individuals in the labor force. See note to Table 4 for
definitions of groups and data sources.Table 6
Means of Log Wages of Non-Cubans in Miami
By Quartile of Predicted Wages, 1979-85
(standard errors in parentheses)
Mean of LogWage by Quartile of Predicted Wage
Difference of








































































Note: Predicted wage is based on a linear prediction equation for the log
wage fitted to individuals in four comparison cities: see text.
The sample consists of non-Cubans (male and female, white, black,
and hispanic) between the ages of 16 and 61 with valid wage data
in the earnings supplement of the Current Population Survey. Wages
are deflated by the Consumer Price Index 1980—100.Tabi. 7
Comparison of Wa4.5. Un.mptoym.nt Rat..,and
Employm.nt Rat.. forBlacksin Miami and Comparison Citi..
(standard •rror. in p&t.nth.5S)
All. Slacks, Low-EducationBlacks:
Dltf.r.nc. in LOS Wit..Ohff.r.nc.in Emp/Un.mp Diff.r.nc. to LOS Wa5..Diff.rsnc* in Emp/Unsap
Mi.ai -CpsoarlSon Miami -ComoarisOn Mtaai -Comparison Miami -Corsonrilon
ACtu.1Adjustad EmpPop Rst.Un.mpRat. Actual,AdJuut.d EmpPOp Rat.Un.mpRat.
1979 -.15 —.12 .00 —2.0 -'13 'iS .03 .8
(.03) (.03) (.03) (1.9) (.03) (.03) (06) (3.8)
1980 —.16 —.12 .05 —7.1 —.07 —.07 .03 -8.2
(.03) (.03) (.33) (1.6) (.05) (.00) (.06) (3.5)
1981 -.11 -.10 .02 —3.0 —.03 -.11 .04 -7.7
(.03) (.03) (.03) (2.0) (.05) (.0)) (.06) (6.2)
1982
-.2. —.20 —.06 3.3 -.17 -.20 -.04 .6
(.03) (.03) (.03) (2.6) (.05) (.00) (.0*) (4.7)
1993 —.21 .13
-.02 .1 —.13 —.11 .0* 3.3
(.03) (.03) (.03) (2.7) (.060 (.05) (.04) (4,7)
1984 —.10 -.03 —.04 2.1 —.04 —.03 .05 .1
(.03) (.03) (.03) (2.4) (.06) (05) (.0*) (4.7)
1983 —.05 —.01 —.06 —5.3 .18 .09 .00 -4.7
(.04) (.04) (.04) (2.6) (.07) (.07) (.06) (5.6)
Sot..:Low •duCatiOn blacks inctud. thoa. with L.a. than 12 y..raofcompL.t.d .ducation. Ad.just.d dift.r.oc.s to
Lowa8.5 b.tw..nblacks to Miami and comparison itt!.. ar. obt.in.d from a Lin.ar r.sr.ssion mod.i that
tnclud.5 •ducation. pot.ntt.L .mp.rtsnca. and oth.r control vartabl.s:S..t.xt. Wa5.,irad.ftat.d by lbs
Consum.rPric.Ind.x(1980100).Emp—Pop Rat.r.f.ratolb. •mploym.nt popul.tiOn ratio.Un.mp Rat.
r.fsrstoth. un.mploym.nt rat. amonsthou.intha labortori..Tab).. S
Main. of Log Ua1.s of Cubans in Miami:
Actual and Pr.dict.d. And 8y Quartile of Predicted We4.,
(standard error. in par.nttt.s.s)













Actual Pr.dictad Predicted 1.1 2nd 3rd 4th Actual Adjusted
0.ar
1979 1.58 1.73 -.15 1,31 1.44 1.64 1.90 1.71 —.13 —.10
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.04) (.051 (.04) (.06) (.06)
1980 1.56 1.68 -.16 1.25 1.69 1.59 1.81 1,66 - 12 -.06
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.03) (.04) (03)
1981 1.51 (.68 -.17 1.23 1.43 (.53 1.80 1.63 - 13 —.09
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03)(.04) (.05) (.03) (.041 (.03)
1962 1.49 1.68 -.19 1.27 1.43 1.50 1.77 1.71 - 22 - 12
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.04)(04) (.05) (.03) (.04) (.03)
1983 1.48 1.55 -17 1.16 1.41 1.56 1.80 1.62 -14 -.08
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.04) (.04)(06) <.03) (.04) 1.03)
1964 1,53 1.59 -.17 1.20 1.40 1.65 1.68 1.63 —.10 -.08
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.0.1 (.05) <.06) (.03) (.0'.) (.03)
1985 1 69 1.67 -.18 1.19 1.63 1 53 1.80 1.77 -.27 -.19
(.04) (.03) <.05) (.06) (.06) (.08) (.09) (.06) (.07) (.05)
Motes: Predicted waleisbased on alinearprediction equation for the to; was, fitted to individuals
conparlaon ccli.,: seetext.Pr.dictsd wares forCubansin Miami are based on coefficients for
in tour
Hispanic. in comparison cities. Tb. adjusted we;. ap between Cubans in Miami end Cubans Sn th, rest of the
US are obtained from alinearr.;ression model that includes education, potential experience, and other
control variable,: seetext.W.$.s are deflated by Lb. Consumer Price Index 1980—100.table 9
Industry Distributions in Miami and ALL US:
Based on March CPS Data for 1978-79 and 1983-84
Average of 1978 and 1979 Average of 1983 and 1984
Percent in md: Percent Percent in md: Percent
Ratio- Cuban in Ratio: Cuban in
MiamiAll USMiami/US Miami MiamiAll USMiami/USMiami
I AgricuLture 0.83 2.28 0.35 33.6 2.54 2.33 1.09 27.7
2 Mining 0.00 0,90 0.00 0.0 0.30 0.96 0.31 0.0
3Construction 7.33 6.08 1.21 31.0 6.69 6.15 1.09 35.6
4.taxtiles& 5,53 2.27 2,44 75,0 4.60 2.17 2.12 60.7
Apperal
5 Other Mfg. 10.47 21,42 0.49 45.0 9.59 18,42 0.52 40.7
6. transportation 7.33 3.63 2,02 14.2 7.93 3.30 2.40 14.3
7, Communication 1.34 1.41 0.95 0.0 1.59 1.56 1.02 0.0
8. UtiLities 1.43 1.36 1.05 7.0 2,07 1.44 1.44 0.0
9, WhoLes. trade 6.35 3.67 1.73 41.8 6.02 3,95 1.52 41.0
10. Eating & 5,46 5.33 1,02 22.5 6.43 5.80 1.11 13.7
Drinking
11. Other RetaiL 15,76 12.21 1.29 30.7 12,36 11.90 1,04 31,4
trada
12. FIRE 5.76 5.48 1.05 31,7 6.61 6.11 1,11 44.8
13. Lass-SkilLed 4.36 3.07 1.42 14.2 4.91 3.43 1,43 31.8
Sarvices
14 Othar Businass 2,81 3,07 0.92 27.2 3.78 4,23 0.89 20,7
Sarvicas
11. Oth.r Personal. 2.56 1.68 1.36 41,3 2,04 2.13 0.96 24,2
S a rvi c as
16. ProfassionaL 16.96 20.35 0.83 18.5 16.96 20.52 0,83 22.0
Servicaa
17. Public Admin. 5.70 5,57 1.02 16.1 5.35 5.42 0.99 8.1
Not.: Samples consist of all workers age 16-61 with positive earnings and masks worked in the
previous year from 1979. 1980. 1984 and 1985 March CPS. Industry refers to industry on
main Job Seat year. Less-Skilled service induatrias include services to dwellings (part
of business services); and private households, hotels and motels, and Laundries and garment
services Ipert of personal services). Entertainment industries are included with personal
services. Sample sizes are 1.033 (Miami. 1978—79); 1,070 (Miami, 1983—84); 147.989 (AlL US,
1976—79); and 142.676 (AlL US. 1983'64 I